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Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the recent discussion on the time-reversal invariance of classical 
electrodynamics (see (Albert 2000: ch.1), (Arntzenius 2004), (Earman 2002), (Malament 2004), 
(Horwich 1987: ch.3)) can be best understood assuming that the disagreement among the 
various  authors  is  actually  a  disagreement  about  the  metaphysics  of  classical 
electrodynamics. If so, the controversy will not be resolved until we have established which 
alternative  is  the  most  natural.  It  turns  out  that  we  have  a  paradox,  namely  that  the 
following  three  claims  are  incompatible:  the  electromagnetic  fields  are  real,  classical 
electrodynamics is time-reversal  invariant, and the content of the state of affairs of the world 
does not depend on whether it belongs to a forward or a backward sequence of states of the 
world.  
Keywords:  Classical  Electrodynamics;  Time-reversal  Invariance;  Field  Ontology; 
Symmetries.
1     Introduction
A recent disagreement among philosophers of physics revolves around the question of 
whether classical electrodynamics is time-reversal invariant. David Albert (2000: ch.1) 
argues that classical electrodynamics violates time-reversal invariance, while orthodoxy 
has been defended, among others, by Frank Arntzenius (2004), John Earman (2002), and 
David  Malament  (2004).  Paul  Horwich  (1987:  ch.3)  instead,  has  put  forward  an 
intermediate position, which has been taken to be incoherent (Arntzenius 2004). In this 
paper, it is argued that the analysis discussed in the literature does not get us to the 
heart of the matter, and does not account for Horwich's position. We argue that different 
judgments  about  time-reversal  invariance of classical electrodynamics rest on different  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judgments about what the ontology of classical  electrodynamics is.  If  so,  we cannot 
settle the dispute over the time-reversal invariance of classical electrodynamics until we 
have established which alternative is the most natural way to interpret the formalism of 
classical electrodynamics. It turns out that each alternative classical electrodynamics is 
so costly that the situation could be described as a paradox, which we dub ‘Maxwell's 
Paradox’ . Assuming that a possible history of the world is a sequence of instantaneous 1
states, it seems to be impossible to simultaneously hold that: 1) electromagnetic fields 
are  just  as  real  as  particles;  2)  that  the  ontology of  the  theory does  not  depend on 
whether we are considering the forward or the backward history of the world; and 3) 
that classical electrodynamics is time-reversal invariant. 
In  Section 2  Albert’s  argument  against  the  time-reversal  invariance  of  classical 
electrodynamics  is  presented,  while  in  Section  3  we  discuss  the  defense  of  the 
traditional position. In Section 4, it is argued that the different proposals are different 
choices of the ontology of classical electrodynamics. An analysis of the merits and the 
objections  of  each  of  these  theories  are  provided  in  Section  5,  and  in  Section  6, 
Maxwell’s paradox is formulated and discussed. 
2     The Argument against invariance
According to Albert (2000: ch.1), a complete description of the world, the instantaneous 
state of the world S, has to be genuinely instantaneous (i.e., the descriptions at different 
times must be independent) and complete. Typically, in classical mechanics the state is 
taken to be constituted by the couple of positions and velocities. Albert instead thinks 
that such a couple should be called the dynamical condition D at an instant: it violates 
independence  (since  the  velocity  depends  on  the  position)  and  provides  all  the 
information required “in order to bring the full predictive resources of the dynamical 
laws  of  physics  to  bear”  (Albert  2000:  17).  Rephrasing,  the  instantaneous  state  S 
represents what exists in the world at one instant,  while the dynamical condition D 
specifies what is needed at one time to determine the state of the system at another 
time.  According  to  Albert,  thus,  in  classical  mechanics,  S  is  given  by  the  particles' 
positions, while D by the positions and the velocities. 
A time-reversal transformation involves an operator T that transforms a possible 
temporal sequence of instantaneous states S1, S2, …, SN (a possible history of the world), 
into the backward sequence T(SN), T(SN-1), …, T(S1) = SN, SN-1, …, S1. According to the 
traditional  notion  of time-reversal invariance,  a theory is time-reversal invariant if and  
Note that the name does not refer to anything that Maxwell wrote or implied; Maxwell did not give his 1
name  to  a  paradox.  We  decided  to  call  it  like  that  simply  because  the  main  equations  of  classical 
electrodynamics are Maxwell’s equations. 
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only if, for each  possible  history of  the world also the  backward sequence is a possible 
history of the world. A history of the world can be thought as a movie, in which the 
sequence of the various instantaneous states is the sequence of the different frames. To 
say  that  a  theory  is  time-reversal  invariant  is  then  to  say  that  the  movie  projected 
backward and the movie projected forward both represent possible state of affairs of the 
world. Albert claims that S should be invariant under T: S represents what there is in the 
world and a sequence of instantaneous states represents a possible history of the world, 
so remembering the movie analogy, T is acting on the ordering of the frames, not on 
their content, which should remain the same.
In classical mechanics, the instantaneous state S remains invariant under T: T(x) = 
x. The velocity instead flips sign, since it transforms under T according to its definition 
as a function o f x and t: 
                                    (i)
Therefore,  while  S=(x)  is  left  unchanged,  D  =  (x,v)  transforms  as  T(x,v)  =  (x,−v). 
Classical mechanics is time-reversal invariant because both the forward history and the 
backward history are possible histories of the world. 
When considering classical electrodynamics, Albert believes we need to add to S 
also “the magnitudes and directions of the electric (E) and magnetic (B) fields at every 
point in space” (Albert 2000: 14). That is, the instantaneous state is given by the triplet 
(x,E,B). The fields are, unlike velocities, logically independent of the particles' positions 
and therefore they should be added to S in order to complete the picture of the world at 
one  time.  That  is,  electromagnetic  fields  are  real  just  as  much  as  the  particles  are. 
According to  Albert,  as  we already saw,  the  instantaneous  state  should not  change 
under T. Indeed, velocity is defined as the rate of change of position, so that it would 
make sense for it  to flip sign under T.  However,  the fields have no such definition: 
magnetic fields are not the rate of change of anything. Thus, he argues, they should be 
mathematically  represented simply by vector  functions,  which would not  transform 
under T. Therefore, we would have T(x,E,B) = (x,E,B). As a matter of fact, though, in 
order for classical electrodynamics to be time-reversal invariant, we need S to change 
under T: in particular, we need T(E) = E, and T(B) = −B. Given a possible history of the 
world S1, S2, …, SN then S’N, S’N-1, …, S’1 (where S’ = (x,E,−B) for any time) is also a 
possible history of the world, while SN, SN-1, …, S1 is not. This is incompatible with the 
requirement above, so classical electrodynamics is not time-reversal invariant. 
It is useful to spell out Albert's argument schematically as follows: 
1. [FIELDS]:  In  classical  electrodynamics,  electromagnetic  fields  belong  to  the 
instantaneous state. That is S = (x,E,B);  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2. [TIME-REVERSAL]: a time-reversal transformation T is one that turns a sequence 
of states of the world  S1, S2, …, SN  into its reverse T(SN), T(SN-1), …,T(S1) = SN, 
SN-1, …, S1; 
3. [T-R  INVARIANCE]:  A  theory  is  time-reversal  invariant  just  in  case  the 
(theoretical)  forward  and  backward  sequences  of  states  of  the  world  both 
correctly describe possible states of affairs of the world;
4. In particular, for classical electrodynamics to be time-reversal invariant we need 
B to flip sign under T. That is, T(B) = −B;  
5. [STATE]:  Under a  time-reversal  transformation,  the instantaneous state  of  the 
world at one time does not change. That is, T(S) = S; 
6. In particular, T(B) = B;
7. (6) contradicts (4); 
8. Therefore, classical electrodynamics is not time-reversal invariant. 
Albert judges [FIELDS], [TIME-REVERSAL], [T-R INVARIANCE], [STATE] and the fact 
that there is no reason for B to flip sign under T to be so obviously true that we have to 
reject that classical electrodynamics is time-reversal invariant . Clearly, this is not the 2
only possibility: one could reject one (or more) of the other premises. We argue that the 
disagreement  about  the  time-reversal  invariance  of  classical  electrodynamics  can  be 
accounted  for  focusing  on  [FIELDS]  and  [STATE],  and  that  it  is  fundamentally  a 
disagreement about ontology. 
3     The Defense of Invariance
Arntzenius (2004), Earman (2002), and Malament (2004), among others, disagree with 
Albert's  conclusion  about  the  lack  of  time-reversal  invariance  of  classical 
electrodynamics.  These  three  accounts  differ  in  the  details,  but  ultimately  are  very  
Let us remind the reader why Albert engages in the issue of time reversibility in a book in which he 2
discusses the foundations of statistical mechanics. Albert, who follows closely Boltzmann, wants to show 
that the tension between the time irreversibility of macroscopic phenomena and the time reversibility of 
the  underlying  microscopic  physics  is  ultimately  not  problematic  if  we  take  into  account  statistical 
mechanics. Therefore, in order to set up the discussion, he needs to clarify what it means for a theory to 
be time-reversal invariant, and to show that the microphysics is time-reversal invariant (in some relevant 
sense). In developing his account of the notion, he concludes that classical mechanics is time-reversal 
invariant (since velocities are rates of changes of positions, their time-reversal is given by turning all 
velocities around, as usually intended), and thus he finds the tension mentioned above. The situation 
changes, though, if we consider other theories. He writes: “None of the fundamental physical theories that 
anybody has taken seriously throughout the past century and a half is (as I mentioned above) invariant 
under time-reversal”. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the tension has disappeared. In fact, we still 
have  it  because  “[m]ost  of  them  [fundamental  physical  theories]  are  time-reversal  invariant, though,
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similar: their common goal is to show how one can naturally define the electromagnetic 
fields  so  that  they  transform  under  T  as  required  in  order  to  make  classical 
electrodynamics  time-reversal  invariant.  Because of  this  similarity,  we will  call  their 
account  ‘AEM’  (from  their  initials).  Malament’s  account  seems  more  complete  and 
detailed than the ones of Earman and Arntzenius, thus we will describe it in a little 
more  detail  in  the  following .  In  Malament’s  paper,  the  electromagnetic  fields  are 3
defined as follows. Let us consider a smooth, connected 4-dimensional manifold M and 
a pseudo-Riemannian metric gab with signature (1,3) on M, i.e. a relativistic space-time. 
The worldline of any (massive) point-particle can be described therefore as a smooth 
curve  on  M.  The  electromagnetic  force  can  be  represented  just  by  a  map from the 
tangent line to the curve to force vectors, regardless of any temporal orientation, in any 
point:  (L,q)  →  F(L,q).  To choose a  temporal  direction,  we take a  direction of  the 4-
velocity va. So, the force is represented by the map va → Fa(va,q). In requiring that this 
map has the desired properties (for instance, that it is linear in q, and that the force is 
Roughly put, Earman argues that writing classical electrodynamics in a covariant form in terms of the 3
electromagnetic tensor F, and defining the 4-vector potential in terms of it and of the Green function, one 
obtains the correct transformations for E and B under time-reversal, defined as inverting a continuous 
non-vanishing timelike  vector  field  (given that  E  and B  can be  defined in  terms of  the  4-potential). 
According  to  Earman  himself,  his  account  differs  from  the  one  of  Malament  only  in  the  fact  that 
Malament assumes rather than derives the transformation for the electric filed, but the overall idea is very 
similar. Arntzenius also argues that “the correct conception of the electromagnetic 4-potential is that it is a 
4-vector that lives in tangent space, transforms like a tangent vector, and can interact with other tangent 
vectors, even though is not tangent to any actual worldline […]. But once one accepts this, it is clear that 
4-potentials  transform non-trivially  under (passive and active)  time-reversal,  and hence that  classical 
electromagnetism is invariant under time-reversal, precisely as orthodoxy would have it” (Arntzenius 
2004: 37).
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insofar as the positions of particles are concerned” (Albert 2000: 15). An anonymous reviewer has pointed 
out that it is unclear why we should even discuss Albert’s view of time-reversal, given that at the end it is 
not  the relevant notion to set  up the foundations of  statistical  mechanics.  Another reviewer has also 
complained that Albert’s view has been heavily and devastatingly criticized by many authors (see, for 
instance, (Arntzenius 2000), (Earman 2002), (Malament 2004)), so it is obviously a dead view. We disagree, 
since we think it is worthwhile discussing Albert’s view and taking it seriously. In fact, it seems to be 
interesting  for  a  variety  of  reasons.  First,  because  it  is  not  obviously  false,  and  as  such  deserves 
consideration. Second, because the objections against it are not controversial either, as we will see. Third, 
because  even  if  at  the  end  Albert’s  notion  of  time-reversal  will  not  change  the  discussion  in  the 
foundations  of  statistical  mechanics,  it  will  change  the  metaphysical  picture  we  get  from  classical 
electrodynamics, and also it will give us insights (he claims) in the foundations of quantum mechanics. 
Fourth, because the distinction he draws between the instantaneous state and the dynamical condition 
can clarify the role of the various variables in a fundamental physical theory (see later on the connection 
with the primitive ontology view, fn. 11).
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orthogonal to the velocity), we get that it has to be represented by an antisymmetric 
tensor:
                                                                                                 (ii)                                                               
From  Fab  and  the  currents,  we  can  recover  classical  electrodynamics  (namely,  the 
Lorentz force and Maxwell’s  equations).  Arguably,  in Malament’s  account,  the time-
reversal operation is understood as flipping the temporal orientation originally chosen. 
Given (ii), it is straightforward that T(Fab) = −Fab  because the choice of an orientation is 
a choice of the direction of va. From this, Malament shows that it follows that Maxwell’s 
equations  are  time-reversal  invariant.  Suppose  we  want  to  know  how  the  fields 
transform. We can recover Maxwell’s equations not in terms of Fab, but in terms of E and 
B as soon as we specify additional structure (see details in Malament (2004)). We need a 
spatial structure to specify B, in addition to a temporal orientation. In this way, we see 
that,  under  the  properly  defined  time-reversal  invariance,  we  get  the  correct 
transformations since E turns out to be a polar vector and B an axial vector, rather than 
a scalar or a vector field. This explains why B flips sign under T and E does not: by 
definition, under reflection a polar (or true) vector will match its mirror image, while an 
axial (pseudo) vector will match its mirror image in magnitude, but it will point in the 
opposite direction. 
To be able to compare properly Albert's approach to the one of AEM, we need to 
clarify what AEM take to be the components of the instantaneous state S, and what their 
concept of time-reversal transformation is. The first point is easy: AEM seem to take the 
fields  as  part  of  the  instantaneous  state .  Regarding  the  notion  of  time-reversal 4
transformation, the situation is a little more complex. Jill North (2008) has argued that 
Malament’s  conception  of  time-reversal  transformation  is  different  from  the  one  of 
Albert. According to North, Albert's idea of time-reversal transformation TA “mirrors 
the material content of space-time across a time slice”, while Malament's time-reversal 
transformation TM “inverts the temporal orientation” (North 2008: 211). The difference 
between the two, she argues, is that in Malament's account the temporal orientation is 
considered alike to a physical field, so that some field τ should also be added to S.  If 
North is correct, then AEM reject [TIME-REVERSAL] (namely, that T(S1), T(S2), …,T(SN) 
= SN, SN-1, …, S1), and [STATE] (i.e., the claim that T(S) = S) fails by definition: τ is in fact 
in S, and TM flips it. We think that, regardless of whether there is a difference in the 
definition of  the time-reversal  transformation,  the disagreement between Albert  and 
Malament  is  fundamentally  about  [STATE].  In  fact,  if  they  both  accept  [TIME-
Earman and Arntzenius explicitly hold that the fields are part of the instantaneous state, while Malament 4
is not so explicit and straightforward about it. Furthermore, Malament is not generally willing to commit 
himself to a given ontology of classical electrodynamics (private communication). 
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REVERSAL], Malament, who defines B as an axial vector, has to deny [STATE] to get 
time-reversal  invariance  of  classical  electrodynamics.  If  instead  Malament  denies 
[TIME-REVERSAL], then he would deny [STATE] as well, this time as a consequence of 
his choice of time-reversal: τ is in S, and τ flips sign under T (by definition of   T = TM). 
Therefore,  if  we  generalize  this  to  AEM’s  position,  we  can  conclude  that  classical 
electrodynamics is time-reversal invariant because they assume [FIELDS] but reject that 
there is no reason for B to flip sign under T, since B is an axial vector. Because of this, 
AEM reject [STATE]: B belongs to S, and S will not remain invariant under T (see later 
for more about this). 
In  contrast  to  the  analysis  above,  Stephen  Leeds  (2006)  has  argued  that  the 
disagreement  between  Albert  and  Malament  is  due  to  a  mathematical  mistake  on 
Malament’s  part. Malament's  analysis  is  in  terms  of  passive  transformations,  while 
Albert's account is in terms of active ones. When we consider the active counterparts of 
the  passive  transformations  used by Malament,  he  writes,  we discover  they do not 
provide the correct transformation for B. We think this conclusion is wrong: the problem 
is that in his derivation of the active counterparts of Malament's transformations, Leeds 
uses the constraint that S remains invariant under T, which, as we just saw, Malament 
denies. Because of this, we believe that Leeds’s argument fails. 
Frank Arntzenius and Hilary Greaves (2009) agree with AEM that we should reject 
[STATE], arguing as follows. They introduce the notion of ‘geometrical’ transformation: 
given a particular mathematical object, there is a natural way for it to transform under a 
particular  transformation,  which  depends  on  its  geometrical  definition.  The 
electromagnetic fields are intrinsically defined as to transform under T to make classical 
electrodynamics invariant, so Albert is wrong and Malament right. We think Arntzenius 
and Greaves are correct in their claim that each mathematical object has a natural, or 
geometrical,  way to transform under a given transformation.  But we think they are 
begging the question against Albert: since we are talking about mathematical objects as 
representing  physical  objects,  Albert  could  agree  with  them  that  objects  transform 
under a given symmetry transformation according to their geometrical definition, and 
still disagree about which one is the correct way of mathematically representing B. That 
is, he would take it to be a vector function, which would be compatible with his view, 
and not an axial vector, as AEM suggest instead. One needs in fact to provide additional 
independent reasons to believe that the true nature of the fields is the one captured by 
the mathematics of an axial vector. What Malament and the others have done is to show 
how another definition can be provided, in addition to the one proposed by Albert, 
which  is  compatible  with  the  invariance  of  classical  electrodynamics  under  T. 
Nonetheless, no one has shown yet that this is the correct one. Arntzenius and Greaves 
realize this, since they acknowledge that Albert's position is a sensible one, and dismiss 
it for different reasons (see Section 5).  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Last  but  not  least,  we  have  Horwich  (1987:  ch.3),  who  seems  to  accept  both 
[STATE] (that is, he accepts the instantaneous state will not change under T) and the 
time-reversal invariance of classical electrodynamics. He develops this position in just a 
few  sentences,  so  it  is  up  for  debate  how  one  could  have  an  invariant  classical 
electrodynamics  with  an  invariant  S.  Arntzenius  thinks  that  Horwich  is  simply 
incoherent  (Arntzenius  2004),  presumably  because  he  assumes  Horwich  accepts 
[FIELDS], namely that the instantaneous state is (x,E,B). Instead, we will argue at the 
end of the next section that Horwich accepts [STATE] but he rejects [FIELDS], so that he 
can consistently claim that classical electrodynamics is time-reversal invariant.
4     The Possible Metaphysics of Classical Electrodynamics
We  believe  people  disagree  about  the  time-reversal  invariance  of  classical 
electrodynamics  because  they  disagree  about  ontology.  The  idea  is  that  classical 
electrodynamics  can  be  consistently  interpreted  as  depicting  different  worlds, 
depending on whether we endorse Albert’s view or the one of AEM. The world is made 
of particles and fields in both cases, but such fields are mathematically represented by 
different objects, vector functions for Albert, axial vectors for the others . 5
The  symmetry  properties  of  a  theory  depend  on  the  ontology  of  the  theory: 
different ontologies are captured by different mathematical objects, which have different 
properties. Since AEM and Albert disagree about what kind of object fields are, they 
disagree about what symmetry properties the theory has. Contrary to Albert, AEM can 
accept  the  time-reversal  invariance  of  classical  electrodynamics  because  they  reject 
[STATE]: an axial vector will not stay invariant under T. Therefore, when they argue 
about the time reversibility of classical  electrodynamics,  they actually talk past each 
other: they are talking about two different theories of classical electrodynamics, and it is 
not unexpected that different theories have different symmetry properties. 
Note that it is not surprising that people turn out to disagree on how to interpret a 
theory:  any  physical  theory  is  expressed  in  terms  of  mathematical  relations  among 
different  variables.  In  order  to  interpret  a  theory as  somehow depicting reality,  one 
needs to take at least some of these variables as representing physical objects. However, 
the very same mathematical  framework could be interpreted in different  ways,  and 
certain  interpretations  might be more natural than others: there is, so to speak, a sort of  
It  is  unclear  what  Malament  would  say,  since  he  is  always  resistant  to  commit  himself  to  a  given 5
ontology  for  classical  electrodynamics.  Presumably,  though,  he  would  be  happy  to  think  that,  as 
suggested by an anonymous reviewer, the energy tensor belongs to the state, rather than the fields. I do 
not see a contradiction with what we claim here, though: even if he would take the electromagnetic tensor 
as  part  of  the  instantaneous  state,  this  would  still  make  E  and  B  the  kind  of  objects  that  properly 
transform to make classical electrodynamics invariant under T. 
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underdetermination  of  the  ontology  by  the  formalism.  Given  its  definition,  the 
instantaneous  state  S  captures  the  metaphysics  of  the  theory,  while  the  dynamical 
condition D contains also the variables needed to implement the dynamics for the stuff 
in the instantaneous state S. To make this point also graphically, we can use the symbol 
‘;’. It will separate in D the elements that belong to S, which we will put on the left of the 
semicolon, from the rest of the variables in the theory. Interpreting the mathematical 
object in S in the ‘most natural way’ will give us what there is physically in the world. 
For example, in classical mechanics D = (x;v) and S = (x), which naturally represents 
point-particles. In classical electrodynamics one could argue about which is the most 
appropriate  way  of  mathematically  describing  E  and  B,  and  each  choice  has 
consequences: the symmetry properties of a theory are the symmetry properties of the 
objects in its ontology  and  different mathematical objects will behave differently under 
a given transformation. As a result, depending on what mathematical objects we take to 
represent the fields, classical electrodynamics will or will not be time-reversal invariant.
Therefore, here is how one can summarize Albert's position and the one of AEM, 
respectively : 6
Albert-CED = (x,E,B;)   The world is constituted by particles and fields, the latter 
being represented by vector functions. Therefore, [FIELDS] (i.e. S = (x,E,B)) and 
[STATE]  (i.e.  T(S)  =  S)  hold,  but  classical  electrodynamics  is  not  time-reversal 
invariant. 
AEM-CED = (x,E,B’;)   The world is made of particles and fields, the latter being 
represented by polar and axial vectors, respectively. Therefore, [FIELDS] (i.e. S = 
(x,E,B)) is true, but [STATE] (i.e. T(S) = S) is not, allowing the theory to be time-
reversal  invariant .7
The  disagreement  here  is  therefore  about  which  is  the  most  suitable  way  of 
mathematically describing a piece of furniture of the world, namely the electromagnetic 
fields: are they true vectors or are they axial vectors? 
Notice  that  if  North’s  interpretation  of  Malament’s  notion  of  time-reversal  is 
correct, we would have to introduce the specific time-reversal transformation we are 
dealing with (either TA or TM), which in turn would have us consider another theory of 
classical  electrodynamics.  Therefore,  in  addition  to  the  two  positions  stated  above, 
namely  Albert-CED  and  AEM-CED  (in  which  the  time-reversal  transformation  is 
implemented  by  TA,  which  “mirrors  the  material  content of space-time across a time  
For sake of simplicity we will not mention velocities.6
Here B’ indicates that the mathematical object representing a magnetic field in this theory is different 7
from the mathematical object that represents it in the theory above.
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slice”  (North 2008: 216)),  we  would  also  have  MN-CED  (for  ‘Malament’s  classical 
electrodynamics with North’s interpretation of Malament’s notion of T’): 
MN-CED   The world is made of particles, electromagnetic fields and a temporal 
field. Mathematically, E is represented by a polar vector and B by an axial vector, 
while the mathematical representation of time-reversal transformation is given by 
TM (which ‘inverts the temporal orientation’). As a consequence, [FIELDS] is true 
(i.e. S = (x,E,B)), but [STATE] (i.e. T(S) = S) and [T-R INVARIANCE] are not . Thus, 8
classical electrodynamics is time-reversal invariant.
Of course, one could also disagree about what belongs to S. By moving the semicolon 
we can generate  different  theories  assigning  a different role to the mathematical object 
of  the  same  mathematical  formalism.  For  instance,  one  could  consider  classical 
mechanics to be (x,v;) or (v;x), in addition to the more natural (x;v): (x,v;) describes a 
world with particles' positions and velocities, (v;x) a world with only velocities, and 
(x;v) a world with only particles’ positions . We will assume that velocities are not in the 9
instantaneous  state.  A  theory  that  does  not  assume  that,  dubbed  the  ‘Feynman 
proposal’,  will  be discussed later.  Note that the fact  that there are different ways of 
reading the formalism does not mean that they are all sensible. For instance, classical 
mechanics is usually taken to be (x;v), and the reasons for this are the ones presented by 
Albert: (x,v;) is not instantaneous, while (x;v) is not complete . Observe that if we start 10
moving  the  semicolon  in  the  dynamical  condition  of  classical  electrodynamics  we 
obtain, among others, the following position:  
Horwich-CED = (x;E,B’)   The world is made of particles, while the fields do not 
compose matter: they are mathematical fictions to correctly describe the behavior 
of the particles. That is, [FIELDS] fails (i.e. S = (x)), but [STATE] holds (i.e., T(S) = 
S), since B does not belong to S, and therefore what B does under T is irrelevant 
and classical electrodynamics is time-reversal invariant. 
Horwich has been accused by Arntzenius to be confused: “Horwich infers that in the 
reversed  history  the  magnetic  field  points  in  the  opposite  direction.  But  this  is 
inconsistent with his claim that ‘basic’ or ‘fundamental’ quantities should not undergo 
time-reversal   operations”   (Arntzenius 2004: 35, fn. 4).   Note,  though,   that  if  instead  
This is because [T-R INVARIANCE] is defined in terms of TA. 8
Note that (;x;v) is also possible, but it does not really seem to describe a satisfactory physical theory since 9
there is nothing in the theory that specifies what there is in the world.
Arguably, an Aristotelian about properties would like (x,v;) very much, since it describes a world in 10
which we have  both  the  objects  and  the  velocities.  This  seems to  be  discussed also,  for  instance,  in 
(Arntzenius 2000), (Forrest 1998) and (Tooley 1988).
!10
Maxwell’s Paradox: the Metaphysics of Classical Electrodynamics and its Time-Reversal Invariance!
Horwich is taken to endorse the theory discussed last, the confusion dissolves and there 
is no inconsistency in this position: the fields do not belong to the instantaneous state S, 
and therefore they are not part of the basic and fundamental quantities. Note that the 
important point here is not so much to recover the actual position of Horwich: it might 
well be that he might not hold this position and that he really is incoherent. What is 
important,   though,   is   that   the   position   above   seems   to  be  a  possible  position, 
independently  of  whether  it  is  a  faithful  representation  of  Horwich’s  own  take  on 
classical electrodynamics . 11
There  are  many  more  ways  of  interpreting  the  formalism  of  classical 
electrodynamics than just the ones presented so far, some more interesting than others. 
For example, we could also have:
Einstein-CED  =  (E,B;x)    This  could  describe  something  close  to  Einstein's 
position,  in  which  matter  is  made  exclusively  of  fields,  while  particles  are 
conceived as singularities in the fields .  12
This theory has not been elaborated by anyone yet and it is rarely considered. Perhaps 
it requires more attention than the one it has received so far, but for the time being we 
will leave it just as a possible suggestion.
Another  proposal  has  been  recently  put  on  the  table:  what  Arntzenius  and 
Greaves call the ‘Feynman proposal’. The idea can be summarized as follows: the world 
is made of fields, described as Malament does, and of particles, but their worldlines are 
intrinsically  directed   depending  on  whether  they  are  worldlines  of  particles  or  of  
In this regard, it is interesting to note that we can draw a parallel between Horwich-CED and a view 11
that recently has gained some attention in the foundation of quantum mechanics, namely the one based 
on  the  notion  of  primitive  ontology  (see  for  instance  Allori,  Goldstein,  Tumulka  and  Zanghi  2008). 
According to this view, the primitive ontology of a theory is what in the theory represents matter, while 
the rest of the ontology helps implementing the law of temporal evolution of matter. Thus, in quantum 
theories the primitive ontology is some object in three-dimensional space or four-dimensional space-time 
(particles, matter density fields, events in space-time called flashes, and so on), while the wave function is 
the  object  in  the  theory  that  allows  to  generate  the  dynamics  for  the  primitive  ontology.  In  the 
terminology  used  in  this  paper,  the  state  S  would  be  the  primitive  ontology,  while  the  dynamical 
condition D would be composed of the primitive ontology and the wave function. Similarly, we would 
say that the primitive ontology of Horwich-CED is particles, while the one of Albert-CED and AEM-CED 
is particles and fields, where Albert-CED and AEM-CED differ in what kind of mathematical objects the 
fields  are  supposed to  be  represented by.  Given that  the  wave function is  not  part  of  the  primitive 
ontology of quantum theories, it is allowed to change in ways that the primitive ontology could not, in 
order for the theory to possess the symmetry properties that we want it to have. The situation is similar in 
Horwich-CED: in other words, the role of the fields in Horwich-CED and the role of the wave function in 
quantum theories  is  similar,  since  they  do  not  represent  matter,  while  they  allow to  implement  the 
dynamics for matter.
The notion of time-reversal transformation assumed here is the one proposed by Albert, TA.12
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antiparticles. The name comes from the following quote from Richard Feynman: “Every 
particle in Nature has an amplitude to move backwards in time, and therefore has an 
anti-particle” (Feynman 1985: 95). Assuming Malament's definition of electromagnetic 
fields in terms of the antisymmetric tensor F, it turns out that the theory is time-reversal 
invariant , but E flips sign under T instead of B. We might be tempted to call the theory 13
(x,E’,B;), but we think this would not be correct since it does not capture the intrinsic 
directedness of worldlines. A better  characterization would probably be (x,v,E’,B;) to be 
contrasted with (x,E’,B;) in which velocities do not seem to be part of the instantaneous 
state of the world. Schematically, then, we would have: 
Feynman-CED = (x,v,E’,B;)   The world is made of particles, with velocities and 
positions,   and   electromagnetic   fields   represented   a  la   Malament, but  where 
T(E) = −E and T(B) = B. 
5     Which Metaphysics?
All the proposed theories seem to be possible ways of metaphysically interpreting the 
formalism of classical electrodynamics. They provide different pictures of the world and 
accordingly have different symmetry properties. Leaving the last three theories —MN-
CED, Einstein-CED, and Feynman-CED— to be discussed at the end of the section, we 
have the following situation. Albert, considering classical electrodynamics to be Albert-
CED = (x,E,B;), judges it to break time-reversal invariance; AEM, considering classical 
electrodynamics to be AEM-CED = (x,E,B’;), conclude the contrary; Horwich, arguably 
considering classical electrodynamics to be Horwich-CED = (x;E,B’), considers classical 
electrodynamics  to  be  time-reversal  invariant,  but  for  a  different  reason.  However, 
which of the above is the ‘true’ classical electrodynamics?
The main argument to favor AEM-CED over Albert-CED lies in the importance of 
symmetry properties: AEM-CED is better than Albert-CED because the former has more 
symmetry properties, and physicists always put a lot of weight on symmetries since 
they seem to construct theories around symmetry groups . To defend Albert’s position, 14
the only choice seems to be to question the importance of symmetry properties. It seems 
a  difficult position  to defend, though, since symmetries have always had an  important  
Here we also assume that the notion of time-reversal transformation is the one proposed by Albert, TA.13
Note  that  the  transformation  (E,B)  →  (E,−B)  will  take  solutions  into  solutions  and  thus  will  be  a 14
symmetry of the theory. Nonetheless, it is not going to be a ‘time-reversal’ transformation in Albert’s 
view,  since  “[m]agnetic  fields  are  not  —neither  logically  nor  conceptually—  the  rates  of  change  of 
anything” (Albert  2000:  20).  Thus,  it  is  hard to see how this transformation could possibly have any 
physical meaning. This is the sense in which one should understand the claim that Albert-CED has less 
symmetry properties than the alternatives. 
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role in theory construction and theory evaluation . In this regard, some have argued 15
that the time-reversal symmetry in particular is important, because its failure indicates 
that  time  has  an  objective  direction  according  to  that  theory.  This  is  controversial, 
though: Arntzenius and Greaves have argued that this is not the case, since it could also 
be due to the existence of an objective space-time handedness . However, another line 16
of argument for AEM-CED over Albert-CED appeals to Ockham's razor (Arntzenius 
and  Greaves  2009):  Albert-CED   needs   a   standard   absolute   rest  and  an  objective 
temporal orientation, while AEM-CED does not. Again, this argument does not work 
against Horwich-CED since the two theories share the same definition of B. In any case, 
the potential problem with this is that one could argue that simplicity is not really a 
virtue.
There are other reasons to favor AEM-CED, even if they are in a sense weaker 
than the one we just saw. One could argue that AEM-CED is coherent with history: we 
started  describing  matter  as  made  of  particles;  we  then  discovered  electromagnetic 
phenomena and added fields to S; only in the relativistic framework did we realize that 
the magnetic fields are mathematically represented by axial vectors, that is we arrived 
at AEM-CED. A problem with this argument could be that when we discover a theory 
should not matter; maybe there are reasons to take the older theory more seriously than 
the  most  recent  one.  It  seems  to  us,  though,  that  this  reply  misses  the  point;  the 
suggestion  is  that  the  most  recent  theory  is  best  not  in  virtue  of  being  recent,  but 
because it represents our true understanding of nature. 
Turning  to  the  evaluation  of  AEM-CED,  it  seems to  us  that  it  faces  a  serious 
challenge: in this theory [STATE] is false, that is the instantaneous state of the world S 
changes under T. That amounts to saying that the content of a state of the world could 
change depending on whether it comes from the forward or the backward movie of the 
world.  This  seems  at  best  counterintuitive  and  does  not  happen  in  Albert-CED  or 
Horwich-CED: how is it possible that the magnetic fields in the state of the forward 
movie point in one direction, but in the states of the backward one they point to the 
opposite direction? One could take this to be a reductio ad absurdum for the theory. As 
we saw earlier, Arntzenius and Greaves try to justify the rejection of [STATE] in terms 
of what they call a ‘geometrical’ transformation: given a particular mathematical object, 
there  is  a  natural  way for  it  to  transform under  a  particular  transformation,  which 
depends on its geometrical intrinsic definition. That is, the electromagnetic fields are 
intrinsically defined as to transform under T to make the theory invariant, which makes 
[STATE]  false  (that  is,  T(S)  ≠  S).  Even  if  correct,  though,  this  does  not  help  at  all, 
especially  since  these  fields  are real: it still does not seem sensible that the field would  
See (Brading and Castellani 2003) for the importance and the role of symmetries in physics. 15
See (Arntzenius 2000) and (Arntzenius and Greaves 2009) for details.16
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be pointing in two different directions in the backward and forward movie. Arntzenius 
explicitly argues that there is no problem with allowing S to change under T: S changes 
under T because we should not expect mathematical objects to ‘forget’ what kinds of 
mathematical objects they are under symmetry transformations. We find this reply very 
unconvincing for someone who interprets the instantaneous state S as Albert does: after 
all, the content of a snapshot should not change depending on whether one puts it at 
the  beginning  or  at  the  end  of  a  sequence,  independently  of  how  one  chooses  to 
represent what is depicted in the snapshot! Another possible reply to this challenge, 
which unfortunately strikes us as weak, is to argue that this is counterintuitive, but still 
less counterintuitive than what the alternative positions propose. 
Let us now turn to Horwich-CED. The main arguments to prefer this theory to the 
alternatives are the following. First,  the symmetry argument could be used to favor 
Horwich-CED over Albert-CED. In addition, a simplicity argument could be used to 
favor  Horwich-CED over  AEM-CED:  they both have symmetries,  but  the  former is 
better because it has a simpler ontology. If we can account for everything just assuming 
there are particles, the argument says, why also assume there are fields? The key, the 
argument continues, is that we do not need them in S: they can simply be regarded as 
playing a role in determining the motion of the particles, the argument concludes. In 
addition to the problem of using simplicity as a virtue, the worry with this kind of 
argument is that it does not seem to be true that we just need particles to explain the 
phenomena. In fact,  there seems to be energy associated to the fields,  and how can 
Horwich-CED  explain  such  energy  if  there  are  no  fields?  Another  argument  for 
Horwich-CED over AEM-CED is that in the former S is invariant under T while in the 
latter S is not. This is the same as what happens in Albert-CED, but here we also have 
more symmetry properties. 
As far as problems for Horwich-CED go, a first worry would be that asserting that 
there  are  no  fields  is  contrary  to  our  intuitions  and  our  ordinary  beliefs.  That  is, 
Horwich-CED makes many of our beliefs false, and theories like that, as skepticism for 
instance,  are not to be favored.  One could respond by rejecting such a criterion of 
theory choice: after all, many of the modern scientific theories ask us to revise many of 
our  ordinary  beliefs,  but  we do not  reject  them because  of  this.  At  the  same time, 
though, to select a counterintuitive theory is always a hard choice to make. In addition 
to  this,  there  are  other  so-called  worries  that  instead  just  seem  simple 
misunderstandings.  First,  one  could  think  that  in  this  theory  S  is  not  a  true 
instantaneous state of the world: there are no fields, so it is incomplete. This is not so, 
though. In fact, the instantaneous state S is complete, since the theory says there are 
really no fields in the world. 
Another complaint against Horwich-CED is that there are no free fields, i.e. that 
all  fields  are  ‘generated’   by   particles.   However,  if  the  fields  are  not  supposed  to  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represent  physical  objects,  then the solutions of  Maxwell's  equations,  including free 
solutions,  never have any physical meaning. Another alleged challenge to Horwich-
CED rests on the fact that the theory is completely indeterministic : if in S we just have 17
particles’ positions, then in the instantaneous state at a given time we do not have all 
that we need to determine the instantaneous state at a later time. However, when we 
talk about determinism what we really have in mind involves D instead of S. That is, 
determinism  as  we  understand  it  should  be  defined  in  terms  of  D:  a  theory  is 
deterministic just in case,  given  D  at one time, one can determine D at a different time. 
According to this definition, neither classical mechanics nor Horwich-CED turn out to 
be indeterministic theories.
When considering the last three theories mentioned above, let us focus on MN-
CED  and  Feynman-CED,  given  that  the  Einstein  proposal  is  too  sketchy  to  be 
evaluated. North argues that the notion of time-reversal TM involved in MN-CED is to 
be preferred to the one proposed by Albert, what she calls the standard view TA: TA 
flips objects to their mirror image; TM just flips the temporal orientation. Since all the 
other proposals we have discussed here are all involving TA, we can read her arguments 
to favor MN-CED over all of them. A first concern with this approach is to figure out 
whether this characterization is correct . Assuming that there is nothing wrong with it, 18
North compares TA and TM on six points. Here is a short summary of her arguments for 
TM  in  a  four-dimensional  setting  and  some  potential  difficulties  with  them.  First, 
according to North, TA lacks a profound justification, while TM does not: 4-velocities 
invert  under  TM  because  of  their  definition.  It  is  unclear,  though,  why  there  is  no 
justification for TA, since North herself acknowledges that this is the straightforward 
intuitive view of time-reversal. The second point of comparison relies on the distinction 
between active and passive transformation:  the charge is  that  TA  seems to have no 
corresponding passive transformation, while TM does. Nevertheless, Earman (2002), as 
North herself acknowledges, proposes a possible passive transformation of TA, and in 
that case the alleged advantage of TM over TA disappears . A third advantage of TM 19
over TA as identified by North is that TA takes for granted that these theories are time-
reversal invariant, while TM does not. In this way, Malament’s view possesses a greater 
amount of symmetries. This seems to be the strongest argument for TM, but one can 
reply  to  it  denying that having more symmetries is a valuable property. Fourth, North  
See (Arntzenius 2000) for a similar worry in the framework of classical mechanics.17
Malament (private communication) has declared that he feels uncomfortable with this characterization 18
of his view. Nonetheless, since the view is coherent, it is a live possibility and indeed can be held by 
somebody else without any problem. For sake of simplicity, it seems harmless to us to continue to call this 
view with his name.
See (North 2008) for further discussion of the difficulties of Earman’s proposal.19
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claims, following Arntzenius (1997), that Malament’s view can be more easily adapted 
to indeterministic theories. Nevertheless, this seems at best controversial, since there is 
an  ongoing  controversy  regarding  which  is  the  best  way  of  characterizing 
indeterministic  theories.  In addition,  the charge is  not  that  TA cannot be applied to 
indeterministic theories; it is rather that it is more contrived. As such, one could object 
that  to  rely  on  vague  notions  such  as  ‘straightforward’,  ‘natural’,  or  ‘contrived’  is 
always dangerous. Fifth, North claims that TM generalizes naturally to curved space-
time, while TA does not. In addition to the problem already identified above, this does 
not  seem  to  be  true,  especially  in  the  framework  of  AEM-CED:  arguably,  it  is  the 
definition  of  electromagnetic  fields  as  Malament  defines  them  that  guarantees  the 
generalization    to    curved    space-time,    rather    than   the   choice   of   time-reversal 
transformation. Lastly, TM provides a better test for temporal orientation because it only 
flips the temporal orientation. In any case, a fundamental drawback of this account is 
the existence of a temporal field in addition to the other elements in the ontology: is the 
addition of such a metaphysical baggage worth the alleged advantages? 
Regarding the Feynman proposal,  Arntzenius and Greaves (2008)  argue that  it 
might be appealing because it is arguably more compatible with quantum field theories. 
On our part, we do not think this means a lot: after all, how to interpret the formalism 
of quantum field theory is even more controversial than how to interpret the one of 
classical  electrodynamics,  and  so  it  is  extremely  unclear  what  is  supposed  to  be 
compatible  with  what.  In  any  case,  Arntzenius  and  Greaves  point  to  a  potential 
weakness of the theory: it  might not be adequate to describe neutral particles,  since 
there is nothing to determine what the orientation of the particle's worldline should be. 
In addition, this picture has all the problems of AEM's view over Horwich’s and over 
Albert’s (mainly that S changes under T), but someone might consider that it is less 
natural than both of them due to the intrinsic directedness of worldlines.
6     Maxwell’s Paradox
We have argued so far that there are several distinct and consistent theories of classical 
electrodynamics.  Since  symmetry  properties  are  determined  by  the  ontology  of  the 
theory, we need to determine which of the previous proposals provides the most natural 
ontology before addressing the question of which symmetry properties a given theory 
has: until we have solved the controversy about which alternative is the most natural 
and  should  be  adopted,  we  will  not  be  able  to  solve  the  disagreement  about  the 
symmetry properties of classical electrodynamics. 
Unfortunately, as this overview has just shown, the discussion is far from being 
settled: each proposal seems to have costs so high that we might even claim that we are 
in  a  presence  of  a  paradox.  Let  us  come  back  to  Albert's  original  argument.  If the  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definitions  of  time-reversal  transformation  and  invariance  have  not  been  truly 
questioned, then it can be re-written as follows: 
1. [FIELDS]: Electromagnetic fields in classical electrodynamics are just as real 
as particles;
2. [STATE]: The content of a state of the world does not depend on whether this 
state is taken from a forward or a backward sequence of states; 
3. Therefore, [T-R INVARIANCE of CED] is false: classical electrodynamics is 
not time-reversal invariant.
If we go with AEM (and similarly for the Feynman proposal), what we get is: 
1. [FIELDS]: Electromagnetic fields in classical electrodynamics are just as real 
as particles;
2. [T-R  INVARIANCE  of  CED]:  classical  electrodynamics  is  time-reversal 
invariant;
3. Therefore [STATE] is false:  the content of a state of the world depends on 
whether this state is taken from a forward or a backward sequence of states.
Finally, if Horwich is correct we have:
1. [STATE]: The content of a state of the world does not depend on whether this 
state is taken from a forward or a backward sequence of states; 
2. [T-R  INVARIANCE  of  CED]:  classical  electrodynamics  is  time-reversal 
invariant;
3. Therefore [FIELDS] is false: electromagnetic fields in classical electrodynamics 
are not just as real as particles. 
Note that if the notion of time-reversal transformation is changed, as North proposes, 
the situation would not change much: we would have MN-CED, in which we add to the 
ontology a temporal field, instead of AEM-CED, but we would still have that [FIELDS] 
and [T-R INVARIANCE of CED] hold, while [STATE] would not, just like in AEM-CED. 
That means that we cannot take [FIELDS], [STATE] and [T-R INVARIANCE of CED] to 
be true for the same theory. Therefore, however we turn it, we are in presence of a very 
counterintuitive  conclusion  derived  from  apparently  acceptable  reasoning  from 
apparently acceptable premises. The debaters thus can be taken to be struggling with 
this paradox: we have only three choices, which correspond to the accounts of our three 
players.  Albert  solves  the  paradox  rejecting  the  time-reversal  invariance  of  classical 
electrodynamics,  motivated  by  the  intuitions  that  electromagnetic  fields are real and  
!17
Valia Allori!
that the ordering of a sequence of states should not change the content of such states. 
However, this is not a small cost: symmetries are important! AEM (and also MN and 
Feynman) instead reject [STATE]. They want electromagnetic fields to constitute matter 
like Albert does, but they also want symmetries, thus they have to give up the idea that 
the  content  of  an  instantaneous  state  of  the  world  does  not  change  depending  on 
whether this state is taken from the forward or the backward story of the world. This, 
again, strikes us as counterintuitive: how can the content of the state change under T? 
Finally, Horwich wants to keep the time-reversal symmetry and the invariance of the 
content of the states with respect to time-reversal, so he has to deny the reality of fields. 
However, is it really an acceptable choice to say that there are no fields?
The lesson to be drawn from this discussion therefore seems to be that classical 
electrodynamics involves a paradox, which we dub ‘Maxwell’s paradox’. That is, the 
following very plausible claims are incompatible: 
• Electromagnetic fields in classical electrodynamics are just as real as particles; 
• The content of a state of the world does not depend on whether this state is taken 
from a forward or a backward sequence of states; 
• Classical electrodynamics is time-reversal invariant. 
No matter how much we would like all of them to be true at the same time, they simply 
cannot  be.  This  is  an  interesting  conclusion,  drawn from a  theory  that  many of  us 
thought could not surprise us any longer. 
!18
Maxwell’s Paradox: the Metaphysics of Classical Electrodynamics and its Time-Reversal Invariance!
References 
Albert, D. Z. (2000) Time and Chance. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Allori, V., Goldstein, S., Tumulka, R. and Zanghi, N. (2008) On the Common Structure of 
Bohmian Mechanics and the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber Theory.  The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 59 (3): 353-389.
Arntzenius,  F.  (1997)  Mirrors  and  the  Direction  of  Time.  Philosophy  of  Science 
(Proceedings) 64: S213–S222.
Arntzenius, F. (2000) Are there Instantaneous Velocities?. The Monist 83: 187-208.
Arntzenius, F. (2004) Time-reversal Operation, Representation of the Lorentz Group and 
the Direction of Time. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 35(1): 31-43. 
Arntzenius, F. and Greaves, H. (2009) Time-reversal in Classical Electrodynamics. British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60(3): 557-584. 
Brading, K. and Castellani, E. (eds.) (2003) Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Earman, J. (2002) What Time-reversal  Invariance is and Why it Matters. International 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16: 245-264. 
Feynman,  R.  (1985)  QED:  The  strange  theory  of  light  and  matter.  Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press. 
Forrest, P. (1988) Quantum Metaphysics. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Horwich, P. (1987) Asymmetries in Time: Problems in the Philosophy of Science. Cambridge: 
The MIT Press. 
Leeds,  S.  (2006)  Discussion:  Malament  on  Time-reversal.  Philosophy  of  Science  73: 
448-458. 
Malament,  D.  (2004)  On  the  Time-reversal  Invariance  of  Classical  Electromagnetic 
Theory. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35B: 295-315. 
North, J. (2008) Two Views of Time-reversal. Philosophy of Science 75 2: 201-223. 
Tooley, M. (1988) In Defense of the Existence of States of Motion. Philosophical Topics 16: 
225–254.
!19
